"Pastoralists and the State in Tanzania"

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Nomadic Peoples, Number 25-27, 1990
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Introduction

Communities which depend on the manoeuvring of livestock on available pastures to produce their livelihood are the ones I refer to as pastoral. They range from "pure" pastoralists who practice little or no agriculture to agro-pastoralists who, despite their agricultural practices, have a strong economic and cultural leaning toward livestock. The "pure" pastoral communities in Tanzania are the Maasai, the Ilparakuyo (in some literature called Baraguyu, Wakwavi or Kwavi), and the Datoga of whom the Barbaig comprise the largest section. Until the beginning of the 1960s, members of these communities practiced little or no agriculture and depended on their livestock holdings for subsistence. Today, the Datoga have taken to agriculture to such an extent that they may at best be regarded as agro-pastoral (see Kjaerby, 1979). Though agriculture has gained increased importance among the Ilparakuyo and the Maasai in complementing their subsistence needs, livestock are still the mainstay of these groups' livelihood.

The literature on the relations between the pastoralists and the State in Tanzania, and indeed in the whole of East Africa, provides contradictory images of pastoralists. The Maasai, for instance, are presented as warlike and aggressive to their neighbours, while in another image they are not only autonomous, but also economically and culturally superior to their neighbours (Merrill, 1960). Yet, in other images, they are presented as backward and conservative, or as people who are meek and always aggressed upon by the State (Parkipuny, 1979; 1983; Århem, 1985a; 1985b). Other sources that will be examined in this paper present the pastoralists as some of the most impoverished people in the country (cf. Lane, 1988). Each one of these images has some validity, but it is more than likely that the way in which the pastoralists interacted with their neighbours and the State is (and has been) more complex than each image suggests. The relations between the parties in question have always depended on how they perceived each other. Available evidence suggests that these relations changed both in space and time. On some occasions there was negotiation, on others there was confrontation, whereas on others there was total disregard for one another. As the perceptions changed, so did the actions, so that it is misleading to view any one of the parties as always having been either the aggressor or the aggressed upon.

In this short paper, I shall look at the way in which the perceptions of and between the State and the pastoralists led to particular forms of actions and reactions. In discussing the relations between the State and the pastoralists as categories, I am well aware of the fact that within each category there have always been several diverging individual and group interests (cf. Ndagala, 1985a:6). However, it is construed that the net results of the different interests are represented by the final action or reaction of each category. Moreover, I have decided to go far back in time to find out whether there are any substantive differences in the relations between the pastoralists and the colonial State and those which exist between them and the post-colonial State. This is based on the assumption that since the composition of the State changes both
in space and time its perceptions also change. One has to identify the different ways in which the pastoralists perceived the State at different points in time, and the way in which the State itself perceived the different pastoral groups. This is an uphill task which this paper does not seek to accomplish.

Pastoralism and Pastoralists Before Colonialism

Pastoralism sets a unique relationship between people, livestock, and territory. It is this relationship which makes it different from other forms of livestock keeping. Territory is used on an "as it were" basis and since its respective components (grass, water, salt) vary from area to area and from season to season, mobility becomes an integral part of the pastoral enterprise. The seasonal variation of the resources necessitates relatively large pieces of territory in which particular parts may be set aside for use during the seasons when their capacity is at its optimum. The fact that a territory used by one pastoral group may be used by another (pastoral or otherwise) makes it a potential source of conflict. The vulnerability of livestock to theft and animal marauders makes security a critical need and compels pastoral communities to have defence arrangements. These factors are specifically mentioned here because they had a bearing on the different ways in which pastoralists were (and are) perceived.

The history of the Maasai, the Ilparakuyo and the Datoga is punctuated with conflict within the communities themselves and between the communities and their neighbours. Accounts of early European travellers in East Africa in the 19th century such as Krapf (1854; 1860) and Karl Peters (1891) talk of fierce wars among the Maasai, and between the Maasai and their neighbours. Writing on the Maasai and Ilparakuyo (misrepresented as Wakuafi) Krapf (1860: 361) said:

The two kindred tribes hate each other mortally, which is, however, a fortunate circumstance for the weaker African tribes; since were they united and ruled by one supreme head, there would be an end to existence of the other East African tribes, who could not possibly resist them, the savage Galla themselves not excepted, for the latter fly before the Wakuafi and Masai, and at most only prove dangerous enemies to them by stratagem and cunning, but never cope with them in a fair and open field.

Besides the written accounts, oral tales about the military operations by pastoralists abound among the pastoral communities, themselves, as well as among their neighbours. By the turn of the century, when the colonial State was taking shape, these hostilities were quite high. Consequently, the perceptions of the State functionaries in regard to the pastoralists were much influenced by the military side of the pastoral communities since that time.

The Colonial State

As pointed out earlier, the pastoralists have been perceived differently at different times and for different reasons. At the beginning of the colonial period, they were seen as barbaric raiders. This image, stemming partly from the publications of the early travellers and the oral accounts of the agricultural communities made the pastoral communities appear as a threat that had to be brought under control. They had to be made to respect the rule of law and be guided "intelligently" so that they could adopt a certain measure of civilization. Several means were taken to achieve this end, as illustrated by the case of the Maasai. For example, Sir Charles Eliot (1905: xxviii) was of the opinion that the Maasai had to be guided because "leaving them to themselves with their old military and social organization untouched seems... fraught with grave danger for the prosperity of the tribe as well as for the public peace". This emphasizes the point made at length by Knowles and Collett (1989) that bringing the pastoralists under the control of the colonial State was regarded by the colonizers as a gift.

During the German rule, the Maasai were restricted to an area south of the Moshi-Arusha-Dodoma road in what was called the "Masai reserve". As Forsbrooke (1948: 10) points out, the objective was to keep
the areas north of this road such as Monduli, Longido, Ngorongoro, and Loliondo free for alienation by the settlers. However, the restriction was relaxed by the First World War in which the Germans lost their colony to the British. After the war, a new “reserve” was created by the British administration. In 1924, the Arusha Senior Commissioner whose area of jurisdiction included Maasailand wrote to the Chief Secretary that “...the Masai Reserve be gazetted as a closed area into which no person may enter unless he is provided with a pass signed by the Senior Commissioner, Arusha, Administrative Officer North Maasailand or Administrative Officer Kilaya” (TNA 17/3). This reserve was gazetted in 1926 as the Masai District and, unlike the former reserve created by the German administration, it covered most of what was then Tanganyika Maasailand. Any Maasai found grazing outside the reserve had ten heifers taken from him or from either his clan or his section and then was forcibly returned to the reserve. Those who regard this to have been a benevolent move because it kept agricultural encroachment at bay up to the 1930s (Parkipuny, 1975; Århem, 1985b:34) seem to overemphasize its side effects rather than its aims. Although members of agricultural communities were kept away from the District, valuable grazing areas with permanent water sources including a greater part of the Sanya Plains and the area near monudi were lost to white settlers. By 1928, no Maasai was allowed to cross the settler farms (including large expenses of unused land) without a permit. The reserve, apart from being an area in which the “warlike” Maasai could be kept under State surveillance was, in fact, a “reserve” from which only the settlers could be allocated farmland.

As would be expected, the Maasai contravened these restrictions. They crossed the boundaries into other Districts, broke into settler farms for water and pastures, and voiced their grievances to the administrators at every available opportunity. It is also said that after the Maasai of West Kilimanjaro had learned that they were being restricted to certain areas to protect settler cattle from contracting disease, they designed a revenge. They are said to have collected thousands of ticks from their diseased stock, put them into small bags and “planted” them on settler land at night. Although the settler cattle had not come into contact with Maasai cattle they soon contracted East Coast Fever from the “planted” ticks. In settler circles this action came to be known as the “Masai-Chagga conspiracy” because it was believed by the settlers that the Chagga knew of the plot beforehand and collaborated.

The alienations of pastoral territory from the Maasai were sometimes done either on the illusion that it was not utilised or, as pointed out by Knowles and Collett (1989:441), on the grounds that after all, the Maasai had stolen it from other communities through their military operations. Yet, there were elements in the State which realised the injustice that was being done to the Maasai, but had to succumb to internal and settler pressures. For example, in 1942 a settler Member of the Legislative Council of Tanganyika asked the Government to reserve about 2590 sq. kilometres of agricultural land within Maasailand for the settlement of ex-servicemen at the end of the World War Two. In responding to the request, the Chief Secretary informed the Council that “A large proportion of the area is unusable for other than pastoral purposes, owing to the unreliability of rainfall, and for the same reason the bulk of the highlands included form an essential reserve of grazing for periods of drought. ...In Government’s opinion the Masai make the fullest economic use of the land which their stage of development and tribal way of life permit and would not, in the conditions which prevail, be able permanently to maintain their present herds on an appreciably lesser area” (TNA 23075). Despite this answer, increasing tracts of Maasailand were passed onto the settlers (see Parkipuny, 1975; Århem, 1985a; 1985b).

In addition to losing land to settler farming, the Maasai lost their essential grazing reserves for periods of drought, among them Ngorongoro, due to the creation of game and forest reserves. The pastoralists were told to realise that “...if they were ordered to keep out of forest reserves it was because it is a well known fact that if forests are destroyed the rainfall decreases...” (TNA 23975). In the Ngorongoro crater, for instance, the pastoralists were
not to burn the grass, they were not to collect honey, and would not be allowed to use the pastures unless they reduced the number of their livestock so that the grass would be enough for both wildlife and livestock. The question of Ngorongoro was raised during the meeting of the “Tanganyika Masai Council” Olkiama, in 1953 under the chairmanship of the District Commissioner of Masai District. The Maasai were understandably very bitter and wanted the Government to review its stand on the matter. Addressing the District Commissioner, one Maasai elder said:

Another thing which we would like you to communicate to the Ngorongoro Conservation Team is that there are predators which get into our homas and kill cattle. Why doesn’t the Game Officer pay us compensation? For example, one moran was almost killed by a rhino and, in self-defence, he killed it. He was charged and imprisoned. We want you to tell them that should wild animals kill our cattle or goats the Game Officer should be charged in the same way as when we kill wild animals. (TNA(DC)/284/11)

After a long debate with the Council it was resolved that the residents of Ngorongoro be allowed to cut trees in the forest for construction of their houses. A similar experience is recorded in respect of the Maasai of Amboseli, Kenya. When it was suggested to them that their area be turned into an exclusive wildlife reserve they argued:

Why should we abandon Amboseli for the sake of wildlife only to have the animals follow us onto our own private lands where they consume forage reserved for livestock? If we are not permitted to graze our own cattle on government land, then why should they be allowed to graze their animals (wildlife) on ours? (Western, 1982:12, quoted by Knowles and Collett, 1989:453).

It is further observed that when the area was declared a National Park by Presidential decree, rhinos were speared at an alarming rate and that the Maasai did not agree to vacate the park until they were given access to the Olutukai swamp, their traditional dry-season grazing area (Knowles and Collett, ibid: 453). In both cases, the State had its way, but not without concessions.

When war and raiding were considered to have been brought under control, the State perceived the pastoralists to be backward and conservative. They were considered backward because they were nomadic and did not practice any agriculture, and conservative because they were less willing to take up these “symbols” of progress. Evolutionists like Huxley saw the pastoralists to be on the brink of their existence due to their conservatism. In one of her writings she said she:

...these obstinately conservative nomads, wandering with their enormous herds from pasture to pasture, some like dinosaurs or pterodactyls, survivors from a past age with a dying set of values – aristocratic, manly, free, doomed. (Huxley, 1948: 89).

Moved by such views the colonial State was at a loss for solutions. Several of its officials in Tanganyika came out with suggestions such as this: “The best policy to adopt is the development of smaller waters to accommodate some two to six kraals – say from 1500 to 3000 head of cattle. ...By adopting this policy it is hoped that in the course of time the “Maasai will become a settled tribe and become cultivators to subsidize the food produced by their cattle” (TNA MF 13, emphasis added). This policy proposal and the perception on which it was based emanated from the “scalar ordering of societies” whereby development was seen to be a change from the savagery of pastoral nomadism to agriculture and, ultimately, to civilization marked by industrialization (Knowles and Collett, 1989). The said conservatism was also attributed to the “cattle complex” which was expounded by Herkovits (1926) and uncritically imbied by many colonial administrators.

In Tanganyika, the State took a number of actions to counter the pastoral “backwardness” and “conservatism”, one of which was the establishment of schools. The first school in Tanzanian Maasailand was established at Monduli in 1937 and admitted 20 boys. This school continued to grow, and by 1951 it had become a middle school offering 8 years of education with a capaci-
ty of 80 pupils. In the meantime, eleven other schools had been established in Maasailand. Initially, the Maasai were enthusiastic about the schools. However, with time, and as the number of the schools increased, parents became less willing to send their children to school. In order to fill the vacancies, it is reported, that in 1945 the council of elders forced the children of poor parents to go to school (TNA MF 13). Still many places remained vacant and non-Maasai children had to be admitted to fill some of them. The decline in the pastoral enthusiasm for schools may be accounted for by two factors: first, the fact that the age at which the children were required for school coincided with the age when they were much needed for herding, meant that the schools were competing with the households for the same children; second, the schools did not "...prepare the young people for their future membership of the society and their active participation in its maintenance or development" (Nyerere, 1967:1; cf. Too good and Hillström, 1970).

Here, again, there were officials within the State who criticised the education system for turning out an undue proportion of "...persons who scorn the use of their hands for any purpose more physically exhausting than pushing pens" because these workers don't produce wealth but exhaust it (Langford-Smith, 1946:4).

The State policies were later influenced by a different view. There came a time when the Maasai were considered economically and culturally superior to their agricultural neighbours. This image was augmented by studies such as the one by Orr and Gilks (1931) which showed that the Maasai diet was superior to that of their agricultural neighbours, and another by Fosbrooke (1948) which, according to Merrill (1960), showed that the returns on labour were higher in pastoralism than in agriculture. Earlier, in 1910, Merker had published his book Die Masai in which he stressed the cultural superiority of the Maasai relative to Bantu communities. This view was used to lure the Maasai into compliance with the State policies. They were reminded time to time to realise that they were superior, but that they could lose that superiority to inferior communities if they did not accept the programmes put forward by the Government.

Cattle markets were established in various parts of Maasailand and the Maasai were required to sell their cattle. The primary purpose was to draw in an increasing proportion of the pastoral economy to support colonial interests. In 1948, the Provincial Commissioner informed the Maasai that they had a duty of "...providing meat and animal products for the Tanganyika and British markets in return, in the latter case, for the financial assistance that they received from the British taxpayer" (TNA 37560/11). Taxation, which was a necessary feature of colonialism, was dependent on cattle sales in Maasailand and other pastoral areas. The various livestock disease control measures were enforced, to a greater extent, to facilitate the cattle auctions rather than to save Maasai stock. The Director of Veterinary Services was often blamed for "...imposing quarantines which The Maasai were made to pay the highest poll tax in the country throughout the colonial period" (cf. Merrill, 1960:126).

In 1930, for example, the Maasai paid 15 shillings, whereas other communities in the country paid rates of between 6 and 12 shillings. The agricultural Sonjo living in Masai District paid 6 shillings while "natives of other tribes owning cattle" in the District paid 12 shillings (Sayers, 1930:185). To ensure that the tax was paid, the cattle markets had to function and the pastoralists had to sell their cattle through these markets only. In 1926, the number of Administrative Officers in the District had to be increased to three because:

The Masai Tribe require all the administrative control we can give them and an increase in the Hut and Poll Tax from shs. 10/- to shs. 12/- would make a sum of 694 Pound Sterling available to meet the additional expenditure incurred (TNA 171/43).

Sometimes taxes had to be collected irrespective of the actual conditions of the people. In 1929, the Maasai had an exceptionally bad year to the extent that the District Officer of Loliondo sent a request on their behalf of "softer" tax collection terms. He informed the Provincial Commissioner that, "...their herds in certain areas have been decimated by Rinderpest and are af-
flicted with a drought ... the severity of which has not been equalled in living memory. Added to these misfortunes what little grass did appear after the early rains was devoured by locusts" (TNA 13430). Responding to the request, the Commissioner said: "... no doubt many of the Masai can pay their tax easily despite the bad conditions. Tax should be collected as soon as possible" (TNA 13430). The Maasai paid the tax by selling some of the few animals that had survived the calamities. This drive to get more and more money from the pastoralists was mostly a result of the view that the latter were economically superior and could withstand the exploitation by the State relatively better than the other communities.

The relations between the Maasai and the State were similar to those between the State and other pastoral communities. However, the latter did not feature strongly because they were relatively smaller and widely scattered over several administrative Districts in which they were dominated by larger agricultural communities, and occupied areas that were at that time less attractive to both the settler farmers and the State. It was thus possible to govern these communities through the respective "Native Authorities" in which they were either underrepresented or not represented at all. This arrangement had many ramifications on the inter-community relations. Members of the Datoga sections were unable to use their seasonal grazing areas across the District or Native Authority boundaries without having to pay the poll taxes in all the respective Districts. Political conflicts heightened and suspicions between pastoral and agricultural communities remained to the post-colonial days. Communities which had accepted the colonial institutions and values regarded themselves as progressive and despised the pastoral groups which had, to a great extent, held onto their traditional institutions. Although no wars were fought between the Datoga and their neighbours, what were thought to be injustices were often "redressed" through inter-community killings and stock raids. For example, the relations between the Datoga and their agricultural neighbours in Singida Region became so bitter that it was prestigious to kill members of other communities because they, like predatory animals, were "enemies of the people" (Wilson, 1953; Tomikawa, 1979; Ndaga, 1979).

The Nation-State

After the country had gained independence, one of the concerns of the new nation State was to distribute equitably the social services and establish an economic infrastructure both of which were regarded as the "fruits of independence". Whereas during colonial days people were confined in their "tribal" areas, independence brought with it the freedom, ujamaa, to settle in any part of the country irrespective of one's place of birth or ethnic identity.

Although this freedom quickened the process of national integration, it had an impact on resource allocation and utilization. Regarding pastoralism, this freedom opened valuable grazing areas to land-hungry cultivators.

In July 1963, the Native Authorities were replaced by District Councils. Districts were divided into Wards, each one of which was represented in the District Council by an elected representative (Councillor). Moreover, each District was represented in the National Assembly (Parliament) by an elected representative. Given the tensions between the pastoralists and the cultivators it was difficult for someone to be elected in an area where his or her community comprised a minority of the population. Consequently, the pastoralists were hardly represented in those Districts where they were a minority.

Whenever the Councillors and Members of Parliament talked about pastoralists in the areas they represented they usually portrayed them as backward and conservative. In so doing, these "representatives" reinforced the notion of pastoral backwardness carried over from the colonial period. In terms of what were regarded as basic social services (schools, dispensaries, water supplies, etc.), pastoral communities were the least supplied in the early years of independence. Therefore, under the conviction that pastoralists, like other citizens, had a right to the "fruits of independence" the State pressed for policies that would hasten the "development" of these "backward"
people. Some of the policies aimed at se-
dentarization of the pastoralists and pro-
ducing them with more schools, dispensaries
and veterinary services, and persuading
them to drop some of their customs which
were considered backward or offensive. I
shall examine these moves in the three pas-
torial communities.

The Maasai

The pastoral Maasai, unlike the other past-
toral communities in Tanzania, have
always constituted the majority in their ad-
ministrative boundaries. In matters that
needed representation they were, to a great
extent, represented by people of their own
choice. Nevertheless, they still continued to
experience various forms of pressure and
persuasions from the State and the national
society. The 1964 Range Management Act
was a precursor to major post-colonial
State interventions in Maasailand. The
Masai Range Commission was set up in
1964 to administer the Act and to establish
Ranching Associations. In 1970, the Masai
Range project, discussed at length else-
where (see Hober, 1976; 1979; Parikipuny,
1975; 1977; 1979; 1980; Århem, 1985a) was
launched and was by far the most ambitio-
ous and most costly project ever undertaken
in Tanzania Maasailand. Under this project,
dams and boreholes were constructed to
provide water for human and livestock
needs, dips and veterinary centres were
constructed in an effort to improve lives-
tock quality whereas more veterinary tech-
nicians were posted in the various localities
to man the facilities. While this project was
going on, the nation-wide villagization
programme came into effect. The details of
this programme, which in Maasailand was
known as Operation Imparnai, are available
elsewhere (Hober, 1976; Parikipuny, 1979;
Ndagala, 1982; Århem, 1985a). The imple-
mentation of the programme in Maasai-
land is summarized by Århem as follows:

To judge from the available records, the
operation was generally carried out
rather smoothly. ...The village layouts
were generally flexibly imposed and
adapted to local conditions. Existing land
use and settlement patterns were usually
accepted as the ground plan for resettle-
ment. As a result, movement tended to be
relatively minor and seldom covered dis-
tances of more than 5 km. The actual re-
location of sites did not have major social

Much of what Århem says above agrees
with my own observations (Ndagala,
1982). In many villages, however, the vil-
lagization programme seems to have ended
where it should have started. Since villages
are supposed to be political as well as eco-
nomic institutions, the “congregation” of
houses was supposed to be the starting
point, and not the end. Yet, up to now
these villages have not been surveyed to
establish and demarcate the area they need
in order to operate viably. There are grow-
ing claims that large areas which, in prac-
tice, belong to the respective villages are
unwittingly leased by District Councils to
commercial farmers or allowed to be taken
over by subsistence farmers on the gro-
unds that they cannot be left idle when so-
mebody else needs them for productive
purposes.

The provision of water and other services
under the Masai Range Project and the vil-
lagization programme made Maasailand
attractive to other occupational groups
which had previously considered the area
less suitable. Leading among these are agri-
culturists who have cleared large tracts of
pasture for crops. The decrease in the spa-
tial distance between the pastoralists and
agriculturists strengthens the exchange re-
lations between the two occupational
groups. It soon became easier for the pasto-
ralists to obtain agricultural produce than
was previously possible. Gradually, howe-
ever, rather than exchange their stock for
agricultural goods which they had increa-
singly come to depend upon (Hatfield,
1974; Hatfield and Kuney, 1976; Ndagala,
1982; Århem, 1984; 1985a; 1985b), the pasto-
ralists themselves began to undertake
agricultural production either directly or
by hiring labour. There are many other ra-
nifications of the State programmes in
Maasailand, but one of the most serious is
the intense pressure on pastoral territory.
The Ilparakuyo

Unlike the Maasai who constitute a majority in their administrative areas, the Ilparakuyo, though living within Tanzania, are the most widely dispersed and southernmost Maas-speaking people (Beidelman, 1960:251; 1962:9–10). Since the devastating wars between the Maas-speaking peoples in the nineteenth century (Thomson, 1885; Beidelman, 1960; Ndagala, 1974), the Ilparakuyo have been on the move southwards. They are dispersed in about 20 Districts and are already filtering into Ruvuma Region further south. In each of these Districts, the Ilparakuyo form a minority group surrounded by much larger agricultural communities. Since I have discussed the predicament of these pastoralists elsewhere (Ndagala, 1974; 1985), I will here use my case study of Bagamoyo to describe the main features of their relations with the their agricultural neighbours and the State.

The Ilparakuyo are reported to have settled in Handeni District north of Bagamoyo in the 1880s. It was not until 1936 that they settled in Bagamoyo in large numbers, though a few may have done so much earlier (Ndagala, 1974; Hurskainen, 1984:81). Large numbers of Ilparakuyo moved into the Pongwe and Msala areas of western Bagamoyo in 1937 due to drought in Handeni District (Mustafa et al., 1980:65). At that time the local communities in Bagamoyo had lost their livestock herds due to famine. This suggests that the pastoralists and the sedentary cultivators responded differently to drought. When the conditions got worse in Handeni, the pastoralists responded by moving out to look for better grazing areas. The cultivators in Bagamoyo, however, responded by selling their stock without leaving their territory. The pastoralists held onto their herds while the cultivators held onto their land. Though the Ilparakuyo were initially regarded as temporary visitors who would shortly move away due to the prevalence of the tsetse fly and the incidence of East Coast Fever, they stayed and made Bagamoyo an important livestock area once more. It is this ability to survive where others fail, and negotiate where conquest is impossible that enabled the Ilparakuyo to thrive with their herds among predominantly agricultural communities.

In Bagamoyo, like in the other areas, programmes were designed to “develop” the pastoralists by way of education and social services. Schools were opened and campaigns were held to make the pastoralists send their children to school. However, most of the places in the schools were normally filled by children from agricultural communities not only because they were in a majority but also because the pastoralists were less inclined to send their children to school. The slow response by the pastoralists to the “institutions of progress” went a long way to confirm the perceptions of the State and the agricultural communities that the pastoralists were conservative. However, the pastoralists fully utilised the veterinary installations thereby indicating that they were not opposed to measures which supported the basis of their livelihood. Despite their being considered backward by their agricultural neighbours, the Ilparakuyo in Bagamoyo were (and are) relatively wealthier than their neighbours. Therefore, since almost all private cattle holdings in the District belong to the Ilparakuyo, every State investment in veterinary services is seen as a favour to an already wealthy minority. This creates misgivings at the local level, and with the growing power of the District Councils such investments are bound to be blocked by the Councillors unless funds are provided directly by the Government.

One of the most critical threats to pastoralism in Bagamoyo is land shortage caused by internal and external factors. The internal factor is human and livestock population growth, while the main external factors are government policies and actions. These factors squeeze the pastoralists and their stock between the cultivators and the tsetse infested bush. The growth of population has necessitated the expansion of the cultivated area. In addition, the acquisition of better agricultural tools and the raising of producer prices for agricultural products has motivated the cultivators to put more land under cultivation. The growth in stock numbers has made it necessary for the pastoralists to look for additional grazing land within the District by occupying tsetse infested bush or by moving to other Districts. Whereas from the mid-1970s the Government has asked the cultivators to expand
their fields so as to make the country self-reliant in food, the message for the pastoralists has been to reduce the number of stock so as to prevent overgrazing and soil erosion.

The opening and expansion of various State projects in the District have increased the pressure on pastoralism either by occupying part of Ilparakuyo territory or necessitating many cultivators to immigrate into land hitherto used by the pastoralists. Between 1969 and 1971, for instance, the State alienated 79,000 acres in Bagamoyo District and around Ilparakuyo territory thereby displacing about 2,000 families (Ndagala, 1974:173; 1986:10). Worse still, the pastoral areas alienated constituted the best dry season pastures. The State institutions seem to have been looking for areas which would give them better results with minimal investments regardless of what this meant to the local people. The leading question that was raised by the pastoralists whenever they had an opportunity was why the State with its resources could not choose other places and leave those in which water was easily obtainable to the poor pastoralists.

Out of the total area alienated 44,000 acres were for the extension of the Ruvi State Ranch. It was claimed that the area was hitherto underutilised by several pastoralist families. Yet, the said families had 7,044 head of cattle, let alone small stock. At a stocking rate of 6 to 12 acres per livestock unit which is the average for that area, the pastures were just enough for that number of animals. In addition, the pastoralists had, over a considerable length of time, accumulated the knowledge of the area in terms of the diseases, grasses and watering points. While the management of the State ranch insisted that the pastoralists quit immediately without compensation, the Ilparakuyo did not see why they had to be evicted from their grazing areas and to be told to reduce the numbers of their cattle when the alienated territory was soon to be stocked with cattle. Nevertheless, they lost the fight.

In the face of these pressures, one would expect the pastoralists to lose their grip on livestock keeping. Instead, they persisted as pastoralists by learning to manage their herds in changing circumstances. The young men, ilmurun, have increasingly become involved in the cattle trade and the securing of cattle drugs and other necessities from Dar es Salaam and other places, (Rigby, 1985:160; Ndagala, 1986:12). In addition, the Ilparakuyo have learnt to deal with policy-makers and administrators through the existing institutions although, at the local level, most of these institutions are still dominated by cultivators.

The Datoga

The Datoga are traditionally a pastoral people who live in and around the Rift Valley in Arusha, Singida, Shinyanga, Tabora and Mara Regions. About 70% of these people are concentrated in the present Hanang and Mbulu Districts of Arusha Region. They consist of more than ten sections, emojiga, widely scattered over the five Regions. Kjaerby (1976: 6) notes that of these sections less than eight have retained their original identity and that most of them were rapidly being assimilated by neighbouring peoples. Tomikawa (1979) lists thirteen sections which he calls sub-tribes and, like Kjaerby, singles out the Barbaig (Barbalga) as the largest and more or less homogeneous section (cf. Ndagala, 1979).

The relations between the Datoga and their neighbours have varied from place to place depending on the spatial distance between them as well as the traditional practices particular to individual sections. For example, Bazuta and Barbaig sections have good relations with the Iraqw in Mbulu and Hanang districts, respectively. Not only has inter-marriage taken place, but also the adoption of each other's rituals. While maintaining peaceable and friendly relations with the Iraqw, the Datoga have always remained unfriendly with their neighbours in the north, the Maasai. They have always raided each other's cattle and caused many losses of lives. Tomikawa (1979:15) suggests that members of the Bazuta section have been migrating due to pressure from the Maasai. For example, the Ngorongoro Highlands belonged to them before being driven out by the Maasai.

With the exception of the Barbaig who are considered murderers, members of other sections lived peacefully with their respective neighbours in all the Regions. The Bar-
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baig are considered murderers because of their murder customs (Wilson, 1953; Klima, 1970; Ndagala, 1978; Tomikawa, 1979). Traditionally, every non-Datoga is regarded by the Barbaig as a potential cattle thief and, therefore, like lions and elephants, an "enemy of the people". Any Barbaig who killed an enemy of the people was rewarded. In case the enemy was a wild animal, the killer was rewarded by his relatives and residents of the whole locality in which the animal was killed. If the enemy was human, the killer was rewarded by his relatives, although other people could reward him. In the 1950s, the killer could collect 5 to 25 cattle in rewards (Wilson, 1953). Not only was the killer given cattle, but he was also allowed to decorate himself during the "stick dance" in which only those who had killed the enemies of the people could join to the acclaim of everybody present. Barbaig young men were always eager to kill any of the "enemies" in order to get wealth and social recognition. Though called "ritual murders" by Klima, (1970; cf. Lane, 1988), the primary motivation for these killings was economic as earlier pointed out by Wilson (1953). These murders created permanent tension between the Barbaig and their neighbours, particularly in Singida Region.

The Datoga have generally occupied well-watered grazing areas. In some of these areas the agricultural communities were separated from the pastoral Datoga by large expanses of tsetse-infested bushes. Human and livestock population growth has brought the two occupational groups closer to one another. This has elevated the competition for grazing areas as well as cultivable land because some of the Datoga, as pointed out earlier, are already practicing agriculture. The increasing use of ox-ploughs and tractors in place of hand hoes has not only converted the tsetse infested bushes into arable land, but has also led to the encroachment of the traditional Datoga grazing areas.

In the mid-1970s when Tanzania's rural population was resettled under the villagization programme the Datoga were left out. This was partly due to the fact that the authorities were in such a hurry that they could not waste time on a small group that was considered very difficult to deal with. When the programme was completed, the Datoga stood out as an "embarrassment" to the authorities and a cause for complaint by members of other communities. The latter did not understand why their own communities with larger populations were resettled, sometimes forcefully, while these few "backward" Datoga were left to live in the "bush" as they liked. Political pressure mounted in all the Districts to have the Datoga resettled. At that time, the areas occupied by the Datoga had relatively a very limited social and economic infrastructure. For example, with 484,540 head of cattle and 264,903 small stock, the Datoga had 11 dips and 4 veterinary centres which were also used by members of neighbouring communities. Therefore, along with said political pressures, the need to provide them with basic social services featured strongly as reason for wanting to resettle them.

By 1978, the programme to resettle the Datoga was ready to be carried out as Operation Barbaig. In each District with Datoga population sites, for the new villages were chosen by the respective State functionaries rather than the Datoga themselves. Similarly, most of the plans were drawn up by "experts" and endorsed by the authorities with little involvement of the Datoga (Ndagala, 1979). The implementation of the programme lasted three years starting in 1978. By the end of the set time, most of the pastoralists had been resettled. In terms of the planned services, only 28% were accomplished. However, given the fact that the 28% was an addition to that which already existed, the situation was expected to be better than before the programme. On the contrary, the situation became worse. The operation had made the Datoga areas more attractive to members of other communities who had hitherto avoided them. Soon, the new facilities were increasingly utilised by groups other than the Datoga for whom they were installed. In some areas, this factor gave rise to new inter-community rivalries.

Around the same time as the resettlement of the Datoga was going on, a State Corporation was expanding its wheat farms in Hanang District by taking over land which formed important Barbaig grazing areas. A total of 99,077 acres were alienated bet-
ween 1981 and 1985 (Lane, 1988:7). A legal battle developed over the alienated land, but the pastoralists affected lost the case in the Court of Appeal because their village had not been allocated the land by the District Council prior to its occupation by the Corporation. This has, apart from heightening the scarcity of pastures, demonstrated the vulnerability of the pastoral communities when it comes to dealing with different State institutions in situations where their village boundaries are not legally established.

Discussion

In describing the actions and reactions by and between pastoral communities and the State in Tanzania, deliberate attempts have been made to show how these influenced (or were influenced) by members of other communities. I consider it important to understand the relations which existed (or exist) between pastoralists and their neighbours if we are to comprehend the complexity of the current relations between pastoralists and the State.

Both in policy and practice, the Tanzanian State has sought to transform the livestock sector “from above” through administrative reorganizations, training of personnel, and the installation and modernization of the infrastructure. In spite of the consequent failures in the past, the current livestock policy still tosses the same line. The pastoral and agro-pastoral peoples who own almost all livestock in the country are treated as mere recipients of the “package” from above, with very little opportunity to be listened to (cf. Baxter, 1986; Ndagala, 1986; 1989; Mohamed Salih, 1990). The fact that, having survived with their herds and flocks against all odds of climate and disease, pastoral people must know something about animal husbandry and pasture management, is hardly appreciated. The assumption seems to be that whereas these people own livestock, they know very little about them, and, therefore, have to be taught how to care for them.

Through the continuous “top to bottom” planning and implementation of livestock related projects, pastoralists have been able to get access to a wide range of facilities without taking responsibility for their maintenance. In Maasailand, for instance, the various installations are seen by the Maasai to be valuable externally controlled facilities which are “sociologically” and “technically” isolated from them (Hatfield and Kuney, 1976:2). The Government has continued to shoulder the maintenance burden even for those things which could have been efficiently handled by the pastoralists themselves if they had been involved. The practice has weakened the traditional pastoral resource management systems (Ndagala, 1989; Obia, 1987). Moreover, the installation of facilities, as already pointed out, has attracted large numbers of people from the over-populated agricultural areas into pastoral territory and made many pastures disappear under the hoe. The diversion of grazing land for other uses has invalidated the “expert” claims of overstocking in pastoral areas and rendered destocking campaigns dubious to pastoralists.

The case studies presented above illustrate how it is relatively easier for the pastoralists to influence State policy in areas where they are in the majority, as demonstrated by the case of the Maasai, than where they are in a minority, as is the case with the Datoga and Ilparakuyo. It is unlikely that the interests of pastoralists will be sufficiently defended in areas where they are in a minority, particularly in Districts with a history of mistrust and hostilities between the pastoralists and their neighbours. Tanzania is a democratic country, but democratic decisions are based on the will of the majority who, in this case, will not be pastoralists. The State may intervene directly on the side of the minority, but this is a risky business depending on how the other groups will react. Some of the services meant for pastoral communities have ended in the agricultural communities often through the democratic decisions taken at the local level. This brings us to the next problem.

Although pastoralism has persisted, the number of people engaged in it, as a proportion of the total population of the communities which are traditionally pastoral, is falling. For example, more and more Datoga have become agro-pastoral, and evidence from both the Ilparakuyo and the Maasai indicates a move towards multi-
resource subsistence strategies. In a way, then, community boundaries are no longer conterminous to occupational ones. Not all Maasai or Ilparakuyo, for instance, are pastoralists. A growing proportion of the traditionally pastoral communities is becoming less dependent on pastoralism. What is said by Hjort (1990:16) to have taken place among the Saami in Sweden is already under way in Tanzania. As pastoralists increasingly get involved in non-pastoral activities they will become less homogeneous and increasingly less autonomous. Despite the fact that the three pastoral communities are still relatively more culturally homogeneous, they are already less so in terms of their subsistence strategies. The general decline of social and cultural autonomy among pastoral peoples in Africa has already been illustrated by Frantz (1975:19).

At the beginning of this paper I argued that the actions and reactions by the State and the pastoral communities in relation to each other depended on how they perceived each other. I also suggested that some of the perceptions held by the State in regard to pastoral communities were sometimes based on the publications of those who knew (or claimed to know) the pastoral communities or their production systems. This means that, apart from the pressures of non-pastoral communities, the policies formulated by the State are not independent of the perceptions of the “experts”. In recent years, State actions have become more dependent on the perceptions of this category. Some of these actions are even justified by the State on the grounds that they are (or were) based on the recommendations of experts. Yet, little attention is given to the role of these people during deliberations about how the State deals with pastoral communities.

A number of mistakes have been made during the different State interventions to “develop” pastoral communities, including those programmes which genuinely sought to improve the life of the poor sections of society. Some of these mistakes have been realized by the State and have been rectified. However, some mistakes were not discovered until the respective programmes had been analysed by “experts” and the findings published. Through those publications, some of the views expressed by the people affected have reached the State apparatus in a faster and, probably, more authoritative manner than would otherwise have been possible. The danger is that in some instances, “experts” are taking the place of the people in the sense that the State listens to them rather than the people whose problems it seeks to solve. Since these experts have different ideological and professional orientations, their reports and recommendations are almost becoming another problem (cf. Anacleto, 1977). The extent to which many of these recommendations represent the short or long-term interests of the respective people in question is hard to establish. Normally, the State shoulders responsibility for problems arising from complying with some of the advice, but the advisers hardly take the blame for their ill-advice.

The Tanzanian State, like other States in the world, is an arena in which diverse internal and external forces, both private and public, compete to control resources (Beckman, 1988:6). Nevertheless, the postcolonial State has been trying to control the resources in order to make them accessible to all its citizens. It has, to a large extent, managed to contain and transcend its internal diversity of interests and has established a social and economic infrastructure in pastoral areas. Its challenge today is how best to continue promoting the interests of the pastoralists without estranging the other groups which are also struggling to get a larger share of the meagre national resources.

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