“Sedentarization of Negev Bedouin in Rural Communities”

Joseph Ginat

Nomadic Peoples, Number 15, April 1984
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Bedouin of the Negev first began to settle in the center of Israel, in an area known as the Triangle, in the middle 1960s. Prior to 1982 all of the Bedouin who settled in the Triangle, in both rural and urban communities had, themselves initiated their successful sedentarization.

In 1979, as a result of the Camp David agreements reached between Egypt and Israel, and Israel's subsequent returning of Sinai, the Israeli authorities decided to build a military airfield in the heart of the Bedouin tribal lands in the Negev. In order to achieve this it was necessary to displace several thousand Bedouin from their traditional encampments. In the arrangements for their displacement the authorities built two settlements, one north and one south of the airfield, where the majority of the displaced Bedouin were moved to. However, 13 families (who all belong to the same descent group) expressed the wish to settle in one of the Triangle villages. In 1982 the authorities chose one particular village, Yamma, where the Government owns land adjacent to the village. However, the villagers oppose this plan and have taken action to prevent the authorities settling the Bedouin in their village.

The two outlined examples of sedentarization in the Triangle, the first where the Bedouin initiated their own successful sedentarization, and the second where the attempt to sedentarize was rejected, may be viewed in terms of a patron-client relationship. In both cases the villages are located in the same region and have similar ecological and environmental conditions.

Theoretical Perspectives

Much attention has been given to the concept of patronage in the anthropological literature. Boissevain (1966, 18), in discussing reciprocal relations between patron and client, states that a patron is a person who uses his

...influence to assist and protect some other person, who then becomes his client* and in return provides certain services to his patron. The relationship is asymmetrical, for the nature of the services exchanged may differ considerably. Patronage is thus the complex of relations between those who use their influence, social position or some other attribute to assist and protect others, and those whom they so help and protect.

Foster (1967, 216), in his study on the Dyadic Contract in a Mexican Peasant Village, uses the expression «patron client» contract and explains that such contracts:

...tie people...of significantly different socio-economic statuses...who exchange different kinds of goods and services. Patron-client contracts are thus phrased vertically, and they can be thought of as asymmetrical, since each partner...
is quite different from the other in position and obligation. Patron-client contracts operate almost exclusively between villagers and nonvillagers.

Wolf (1966, 16-17) emphasizes that:

...the two partners to the patron-client contract, however, no longer exchange equivalent goods and services. The offerings of the patron is more tangible. He provides economic aid and protection against both the legal and illegal extractions.

Weingrod (1967, 400) points out that:

Patronage studies may also move beyond the community-level of analysis to focus more clearly upon those institutions that encompass a number of different 'levels'. Patronage needs to be explored not only in community context, but also as a kind of association, a network of communication, and a means of political organization and control that operates throughout a society.

In terms of our two examples of sedentarization of Negev Bedouin, in the first type of patron-client relationship the landlord villager sells or rents land and/or a house to the Bedouin. The landlord also assists in the Bedouin's settlement and absorption in the village. In this case the landlord villager is the patron and the Bedouin is his client.

In the second type of patron-client relationship, the authorities may be viewed as the patron. The objection of the villagers regarding the settling of Bedouin in their community is focused on the fact that it is the Government authority which is viewed as the patron, and not the villagers themselves. The particular individual who represents the government is in charge of moving all the Bedouin from the proposed airfield site. His individual relationship with the Bedouin is in contrast to the non-individuality of his relationship with the villagers.

Unlike the successful sedentarization of Bedouin where a few residents themselves were the patrons -- patrons of the community -- the Yamma residents see the Bedouin as having a powerful patron who is outside of their community. The villagers realize that it is not the Government in the sense of a governing authority that is the Bedouin's patron, but that that particular individual would be able to make use of the power of the Government. In terms of Weingrod's analysis the patronage that is being exercised in Yamma is a means of control -- it is beyond the community level.

After describing the sequence of the different stages of sedentarization of Bedouin in Triangle villages, I will discuss the two types of patron-client relationships and show that the patronage issue is the key to whether or not Bedouin sedentarization in the area is successful or not.

Ethnographic Material

Between 1957 and 1963 there were six consecutive years of drought in the Negev. Because of the drought the authorities permitted the Bedouin to
graze their flocks in the region north of the Negev. Bedouin with both large and small flocks and herds, and even some Bedouin without any livestock, moved to the central part of the country. These Bedouin worked in Jewish agricultural settlements, while members of their families grazed the animals that they had brought with them.

From 1960 onwards, when movement restrictions were gradually lifted by the Military Government, there were few obstacles to obtaining permits for pasture grazing areas and work permits outside of the Negev area. In 1966 the entire administrative system of the Military Governorship was abolished, and Bedouin could move freely out of their territory in the Negev without permission. Many Negev Bedouin came to settle in Lod and Ramle, two mixed, Jewish-Arab cities in the center of Israel. These two cities became the market and service center for Bedouin who moved to the central area.

Kressel has studied the Jawarish Bedouin community in process of urbanization near Ramle. He describes the different stages of their urbanization. First, the young men came and after working for a while brought other family members. They leased land for intensive cultivation and at the same time used land to graze their herds and flocks. After harvesting the crops they could graze their animals on that land. The landlords let the Bedouin use small huts in their orchards and groves in exchange for guarding their property (Kressel, 1976, 44). Those Bedouin who had come first to the central part of the country, and had already been there for some years, were the first to settle permanently close to their working places. The Ministry of Housing established a small neighborhood for Negev Bedouin adjacent to the Jawarish settlement, which is attached to the municipality of Ramle. According to Kressel (ibid., 25-26), in 1970, of the 166 families (850 people) in the Jawarish neighborhood, 82 families had previously been Bedouin living in the Negev.

The Bedouin who settled in Jawarish, in the towns of Ramle and Lod, and those who settled in the Triangle villages, are of peasant origin. Previously, these Bedouin had come from different areas, such as the Gaza Strip or Egypt, and settled among the real Bedouin of the Negev. The real Bedouin, who on the whole refrain from inter-marriage with them, do not call them peasants (fallahin), but classify them by their place of origin. Prior to their settling in the villages most of these Bedouin were landless. Marx (1967, 78) states that even though the peasant groups owned land, one could still call them «landless» for the land they owned was never sufficient for their requirements.

Kressel (1976, 45), referring to those who settled in the Ramle region, stresses that the Bedouin peasants actually exchanged non-irrigated land that they had leased in the Negev with leased land under irrigation. Moreover, they exchanged problematic Teasing arrangements with Bedouin sheikhs for sharecropping arrangements with Jewish agricultural settlements.

Most of the real Bedouin possess land in the Negev. They have remained there waiting until settlement agreements concerning the land required for the airfield have been reached with the Government. Most of the young people belonging to the real Bedouin families work in the township centers of the Negev or in the Ramle-Lod area. They have profited from the many opportunities for unskilled and semi-skilled labor that have become available in the last two decades. These Bedouin also possess flocks and herds. In dry seasons
and drought years they graze their animals north of the Negev and, depending on ecological conditions, sometimes stay away from their tribal encampment for several consecutive years.

Neither those who are employed nor those who maintain property in livestock are looking to stay permanently in the employment centers or in the grazing areas. They are attached to their land. Both categories of Bedouin feel and act as if they are temporarily out of their tribal periphery. Marx (1981, 120) emphasizes that by the 1970s «the Bedouin derived only about 10% of their cash income from cultivation.» But even though most of their income came from wage earning (some Bedouin even became self-employed as building contractors and in other types of business), they did not leave their land. The Government has constantly tried to expropriate Bedouin land, in recent years mainly by legal requisition. To forestall this policy, Bedouin settled on their land. They realized the value of the land, they maintained rights of occupancy» (ibid).

One can predict that once a satisfactory settlement is negotiated, some of them might move out of the Negev. But until this time none of those who have claims on Negev lands wish to move.

The first of four Triangle villages where the Bedouin peasants initiated their own successful sedentarization was Kafar Qasem, which is close to the urban center of Petach Tikva and near grazing areas which are east and south of the village. The first families started negotiations in the summer of 1963, and before the fall of that year six families pitched their tents on land they had purchased from the villagers. This land was under dispute between the villagers and the land authorities, both of whom claimed ownership. The villagers felt that they would probably not win if the dispute was taken to court, so the next best solution was to sell or rent the land to the Bedouin immigrants.

By Spring 1983, ninety-four nuclear families, all originally from the Negev, had achieved successful sedentarization. At the beginning most of the immigrants were settled in old buildings, either purchased or rented, situated in and around the village. These old buildings were previously used as store houses by the villagers. Several of the Bedouin families are still living in tents.

During the last decade there has arisen a new norm in Israeli Arab rural society. A man will not marry out his daughter unless her future husband (or his family) builds a separate house for the young couple. This brought about a surfeit of new houses and an excess of old houses used just for storage. It was these old buildings, in excess to their familial living requirements, that the villagers sold or rented out when the Bedouin first moved to the village.

After the Six Day War of June 1967, there were several cases where villagers had difficulties in marrying off their daughters. As a result of the war there was free access between Israel proper and the West Bank which resulted in unions between Israeli Arab males and girls from West Bank settlements. This created a surfeit of unmarried village girls (Ginat 1982, 98-99). Some of the Bedouin have married these village daughters.

The sedentarization of the Bedouin in three other Triangle villages followed a similar pattern. The second site approached by the Bedouin was
Qalanswa. This village is located north of Kafar Qasem and is close to several Jewish agricultural settlements where the Bedouin work and graze their small flocks. In summer 1969, the first four families leased land west of the village and pitched their tents there. In the spring of 1983 there were 21 Bedouin families settled in Qalanswa. Most of them live in rented old houses, the owners of these buildings having long ago moved to new and modern homes. Those Bedouin who were the first to arrive in the village already have their own houses. Most of the newly-built Bedouin houses have been erected not within the building zone boundaries of the village, but on agricultural land for which permission to build on would not be granted — if such a request had been made, and it has not. Five of the families are still living in temporary arrangements, two in huts and three still in tents.

As in Kafar Qasem there were several cases of exigency marriages between villagers' daughters and Bedouin males, for the same reasons previously explained. Out of all the marriages that so far took place in Qalanswa, there is already a case where a Bedouin male divorced his peasant village wife.

The third village is Kafar Qara, in the northern part of the Triangle. Some of the Bedouin lease land from the villagers in a sharecropping arrangement and others work in Jewish agricultural settlements or are employed in nearby towns. In the hills surrounding the village there are pasture areas where the Bedouin graze their own small flocks, and flocks belonging to the villagers. The villagers has previously found it difficult to maintain herds or flocks not only because there is less and less territory for grazing, but also because there are not enough shepherds available. A shepherd has a very low status, and all village boys and girls attend school. Having the Bedouin take care of some of the flocks solved a real problem for some of the Kafar Qara residents.

The fourth village where Bedouin are in the process of being settled is Taybe, located south-east of Qalanswa. Taybe is the second largest village in Israel. The negotiations for purchasing land in Taybe began in 1975 and land was obtained south-west of the village. In spring 1983, there were 36 Bedouin families in Taybe, some of whom have rented old houses in the center of the village. Others have built houses under a permit to build storage huts for agricultural implements in the orchards and fields, and a few have built huts but have not bothered to request a permit. As in the other villages, several families still dwell in tents.

In all of the villages there are two categories of families that still reside in tents. The first category is those who did not build or rent houses, and the second category is those who have not yet decided whether they are going to settle in the village permanently.

In contrast to the sedentarization of the Bedouin in the four villages, which took place on their own initiative and who conducted their own negotiations with the villagers, there is strong objection from the residents of the village of Yamma to accept a group of 13 Bedouin families that the authorities plan to settle on Government land adjacent to the village. The Yamma residents argue that the government representatives neither asked nor informed them of the plan to settle Bedouin in the village. The villagers say that the government should have contacted the heads of the various hamulas in the village to explain the plan. They add that the fact that the government authority made no effort to consult with them is very insulting.
The villagers point out that an «invasion» of Bedouin immigrants would create residential problems for them in the future. As one of them succinctly put it, «We don't have enough land for our sons.» The villagers say that it is potential land for village kin and that the higher birth rates of the Bedouin will create problems in the future. Another village makes a point about ethnicity: «It is true that the Bedouin are Muslims in their religion, but they are a different ethnic group. Their manners, customs and behavior differ from ours. It is not good to mix the two societies. It will not work out and it will end in fighting.» The same village also said: «The Bedouin will look at our girls. We will have to keep our girls at home. We don't want intermarriage with them.» The final argument was expressed to me in private: «There is only a small political faction in the village that supports the settling of the Bedouin in Yamma. Thus when the election for the Regional Council comes, the Bedouin will vote for that faction. They will increase that faction's power and weaken our power.»

Here then are two different categories of Bedouin sedentarization in the Triangle villages. The first type is a voluntary one, initiated by the Bedouin themselves -- the negotiations being made on a private basis between villagers and Bedouin. The second type is non-voluntary, initiated by the authorities as a result of the need to build an airfield in the area of the traditional encampment of the Bedouin in the Negev.

The questions that arise are (1) why the successful sedentarization in the four villages was not repeated in Yamma, and (2) why all the arguments which were valid for Yamma did not exist in all the four villages where Bedouin settled previously.

Discussion

The role of «client» in the patron-client relationship in the Triangle villages was not new to the Bedouin peasants. When the Bedouin peasants first moved to the Negev they were clients of the heads of the tribes of which they joined and from whom they rented land. This situation, where the sheikhs were the patrons, was similar to that which occurred in Cyrenaica where patron-client relations were also based on landed property. Peters (1977, 276) says that among the Cyrenaica Bedouin, «the proprietor was patron,» and that «patronage is an important sort of power, particularly so in this Bedouin case since clients are always present in the total population included in the span of a man's power, the more so the greater the span.» But the patron-client relationship also has a revenge aspect. Waterbury (1977, 330) states that the parties may be quite close in the power at their disposal.» For example, in the Negev the clients helped to defend the tribe in times of encounters over grazing land and water sources.

In the villages the patrons were those who sold the land or rented the houses to the Bedouin. In Kafar Qara Abu Rafiq became the patron to the Bedouin. He was employed by the department of Land Authorities and through his services the Bedouin purchased land from the government close to the village but outside the boundaries of the area where they could obtain a permit to build. (In the other three villages the situation differs in that the Bedouin purchased land from the villagers.) Nevertheless, the Bedouin have built 11 concrete houses there, albeit illegally. Abu Rafiq arranged that the local council connect the Bedouin homes to the water system of the village. He is on good terms with members of the Jewish agricultural
settlements and made the first contact between the Bedouin and the Jewish farmers for whom the Bedouin now work.

Clearly, Abu Rafiq's actions imbued the Bedouin with a sense of loyalty which they repaid in the following manner. In the course of the 1981 national Knesset (parliament) elections there was a split in Abu Rafiq's hamula. His cousin, Abu Ammar, claimed to be the hamula's leader and supported the Labor party; Abu Rafiq, on the other hand, joined Telem, the party set up by the late Moshe Dayan. Abu Rafiq's Bedouin clients showed their loyalty by voting en masse for Telem. Kenny (1962, 136) stresses that «the client has a strong sense of loyalty to his patron,» while Boissevain (1977, 81) emphasizes that «clients in turn provide loyalty and support when called on to do so.»

Arranging the settlement of the Bedouin was a long-term and on-going processes for Abu Rafiq. First he had to find a suitable place for them to pitch their tents while the land the Bedouin had purchased was transferred to them. A second stage was to arrange the water supply for the Bedouin. Now the Bedouin are pressing him to obtain permission so that their newly purchased land is included in the building zone of the village. One of the Bedouin explained to me: «We cannot get girls for our sons because if we build it is illegal. Once we are included in the building zone we will be able to become in-laws with the villagers.»

Another Bedouin mentioned that they belong and don't belong to the village at the same time. «We send our children to the school, we buy in the stores of the village, we are officially residents of the village, but we live outside of the village. There is not a paved road to our neighborhood and there is not even one case of intermarriage between us and the villagers.» The Bedouin feel that Abu Rafiq, who has helped them in the past and upon whom they are rather dependent, will help them to solve this «acceptance» problem.

Not only do the Bedouin owe favors to Abu Rafiq, but so also do many of the villagers, for he is very influential in the village and has helped many people over the years. Amongst the villagers he accumulates influence, but he does not however become their patron. Pitt-Rivers (1961, 140) argues that «while friendship is in the first place a free association between equals, it becomes in a relationship of economic inequality the foundation of the system of patronage.»

When the Bedouin first came to the region they became friendly with Abu Rafiq, but once they settled in the village and became dependent on Abu Rafiq the inequality was manifested. This is clearly seen in the voting pattern. While some of Abu Rafiq's friends in the village supported him and voted for Telem, all his Bedouin clients, without exception, voted for him. In this way they contributed to his power and prestige. Simply put, Abu Rafiq uses his influence to assist the Bedouin who become his «clients» and in return provide certain services to their patron (Boissevain 1966, 18).

The two Bedouin families who came first to Kafar Qasem became the clients of two different village patrons who are members of two different hamulas. One of the Bedouin families, the Tabuli, were of peasant origin while the other family ran away from Saudi Arabia as a result of blood dispute and took shelter among one of the tribes in the Negev in 1946. Even though they were of pure Bedouin origin, they were landless in the Negev. They arrived a
year-and-a-half before the Israeli war of Independence -- at a time when no land transactions were taking place between Bedouin. Both Bedouin families grazed their flocks south of Kafar Qasem in the drought years of 1960-62. In 1962 they began negotiations to purchase village land and in 1963 moved to the outskirts of the village. In later years these «pioneers» became the focus for others who followed them and settled in Kafar Qasem. The two patrons helped the Bedouin not only in purchasing land but in arranging for them to receive papers from the local council stating that they lived in the village -- a prerequisite for becoming official residents of the village. For a Bedouin family to change their place of residence in the mid 1960s and register this fact with the Ministry of Interior was a formidable task. This was because the Bedouin tribes lived in a Military Government zone. Nevertheless, with the help of the patron, permission for residence was obtained. In the case of the Tabbili family, less than a year after settling in the village their patron arranged for one of the family to marry his niece. In the other patron-client relationship a similar union took place a year later. In both cases the women were in their late twenties and none of the villagers were interested in marrying them.

During the local council election the Bedouin in all the villages supported their patrons. In one village this support helped the patron to pass the minimum number of votes necessary to have the nominated person of his hamula become a member of the local council. In another case it helped the patron to receive a second seat in the council which gave him much more power in the negotiations for establishing a coalition. Wolfe (1966, 17) says that:

the client not only promises his vote or strong arm in the political process, he also promises -- in effect -- to entertain no other patron than the one from whom he has received goods and credit.

The local council secretary, who is an outsider to the two sets of patron-client relations, but who is a most involved person in village social and political life, told me that it was very interesting for him to observe the competitions between the two patrons. He relates that any action made by one patron in building up voting support by the Bedouin was immediately made known to the clients of the other patron, for the members of the two Bedouin families are on good terms and often visit each other. Voting to the local council elections is secret, and this last anecdote indicates that the patrons made sure of their particular Bedouin support by competing in the offer of various services to their Bedouin clients.

In Qalanswa, as in Kafar Qasem, there are two patrons, for the two co-liable groups that settled there. In both villages a stage of relations between Bedouin and villagers took place that is different from and in addition to the patron/client relationship. In both villages, for those Bedouin who settled at a later stage, some of the villagers became their brokers rather than patrons. Another phenomenon is seen too. The first Bedouin who settled in the village, especially in Kafar Qasem, having previously been clients, have now become brokers for the Bedouin newcomers. Boissevain (1966, 24-25) has this to say about the role of broker:

Though the dyadic sets patron/client and client/patron are the basis upon which the system rests, a system of patronage is more than just the sum total of an almost infinite number
of dyadic sets, each of which is cut off from other sets.
I shall argue that essential to understanding patron-client
relationships as a system is the notion that two dyads can
make a triad. The key person in the system is the man in
the middle, the broker, who has dyadic relations with a wide
variety of persons, and is thus in a position to place two
people, possibly unknown to each other, into a mutually
beneficial relationship from which he derives a profit. This
is the raison d'être of the broker...

In a later paper Boissevain (1977, 89-92) presents a typology of three
types of dependency relations of which two are relevant here. The first
type is the relationship between the landowner and the client where the
former provides the land and the latter provides loyalty. The second
type of dependency relation is that between (industrial) laborer and local
big man, often the notary, parish priest or doctor: the patron/broker (ibid., 89). In the villages under study, we meet both types. The villagers
provided land suitable for the Bedouin to build housing on and served as
middleman-broker in helping them to obtain employment. (In Kafar QaraC most of the Bedouin work in Jewish agricultural settlements for wages, and in
Kafar Qasem most of the male Bedouin work in a cinder block factory.)

Much has been written on the role of the go-between (wastah) in Arab
rural and nomad societies. Farrag (1977, 233), in her study on the wastah
among Jordanian villagers, claims that wastah «can perhaps be used in the
sense of broker when applied to the mayor's position in the village.» In
this or a similar position a person has contacts outside the village and
has influence over outside resources that his client can make use of. In
the Bedouin sedentarization case the go-between may be viewed as a broker.

Islam, in his study on patronage in Bangladesh politics, deals with
three concepts: client, middleman and patron. He quotes Silverman (1974)
who claims that «not only may patrons be brokers, but brokers may be patrons.»
Islam (1977, 128) states that:

The roles of brokers and patrons are thus not mutually
exclusive. What I want to show is that middlemen can
become either patron or clients, patrons can become
either middleman or clients, but clients hardly ever
become patrons without passing through the intermediary
stage of middleman.

It is difficult to predict whether the Bedouin clients, who have been
sedentarised for a relatively long period in the villages, will ever become
patrons for Bedouin newcomers. At this present stage the first Bedouin to
settle have so far reached the stage of brokers acting in a parallel capacity
to some of the villagers.

The Bedouin who came after 1967, bought land in Kafar Qasem that was
under dispute between the land authorities and the villagers. It was in
the interest of the villagers to sell this land and in the interest of the
Bedouin to purchase it, thereby bypassing the tricky problem of rightful
ownership. In the latter stages of Bedouin joining the village there were
no patron-client relations, but purely business relations of buying and
selling. Within this process and especially afterwards, the position of
the broker comes into the fore.
The Bedouin need help on two levels: within the village -- establishing social relations and contacts with formal institutions, and in the wider circle of the community in obtaining jobs and residency permits. The villagers as well as the Bedouin brokers serve as a wasta in cases of misunderstandings or quarrels between villagers and Bedouin. In the spring of 1983 there were two incidents in schools, one in Kafar Qasem and the other in Qalanswa. It happens once in a while that a teacher spanks a pupil in class. The villagers usually do not make a big issue of such an incident. However, in both cases the Bedouin fathers of the school children culprits came as a group of several men and berated both the teacher and the principal of the school. The situation could easily have developed into a serious dispute which might even have led to blood revenge. In both cases it was the brokers (go-betweens) who met with both sides and which resulted in sulha (peace ceremony).

Except for a few misunderstandings, the Bedouin sedentarization has generally been worthwhile for both the villagers and the Bedouin themselves, especially in terms of economic cooperation. However, there are still problems in the field of social relations. Not only during the first period of settling in the village, but even now, there are very few reciprocal visits between the Bedouin and the villagers. The villagers state that the Bedouin are of a different culture even though they are Muslim in their religion and speak Arabic. Some say openly that they don't like the Bedouin.

One difficulty encountered by the Bedouin concerns the sending of their daughters to the village school. One of the Bedouin told me that it is against their custom to have boys and girls in the same class and consequently they do not send their daughters to school after they have completed the fifth grade. This particular Bedouin thinks that the reason that some of their sons fail in the exams is that the boys cannot concentrate properly when they see the girls sitting next to them. The Bedouin feel that the educational system of mixed classes should be changed.

One of the villagers emphasized that the Bedouin are more hospitable than the villagers. He says that on visiting a Bedouin family one is immediately offered a meal. In Bedouin terms this means the slaughtering of a sheep. The villagers claim that they cannot reciprocate this sort of hospitality. The villagers do not go to the weddings of the Bedouin peasants, so as not to have to supply a present, and do not bother to pay their respects when a Bedouin family suffers a bereavement. Only those who are affines, brokers or patrons visit the Bedouin on a regular basis, and sometimes this is one and the same person.

The sedentarized Bedouin in the Triangle villages keep contact with their relatives in their tribes of origin in the Negev. They make mutual visits on the religious holidays, at marriages and circumcision ceremonies, and at bereavements. Except for one nuclear family that remained in the Negev, a whole co-liable group moved to Kafar Qara. Despite being the majority north of the Negev, it was they who visited their relatives in the Negev on the holiday ending the month of the Ramadan fast. Their visits and contacts with the Negev emphasize and symbolize their claim for compensation for land which they still own there.

The Bedouin residing in the villages of Qalanswa and Taybe have even closer contacts. They belong to the same tribe, having come to the Negev
from the area of Khan Yunis which is in the Gaza Strip. The Bedouin refer to them as Qla‘iyya (Marx 1967, 79) after the qa‘la (fortress) of Khan Yunis. Until 1968 they did not belong to a tribe of their own but were subject to the authority of four other tribes. Despite being members of four different co-liable groups, the Qla‘iyya pitched their tents together and in this way succeeded in creating their own political framework. As early as the 1950s, the heads of the Qla‘iyya groups asked the authorities to recognize the groups as an independent tribe. In 1968 the head of the largest co-liable group was finally nominated head of the tribe and awarded the coveted seal of the sheikh (Ginat, 1983a).

However, in 1970 a group (A) within the newly formed tribe ceded from the tribe and a second group (B) cut itself off from the tribe one year later. The head of group A wanted group B to join him but group B wanted to become an independent tribe as well. As a result of a dispute a member of group A was killed. The dead man belonged to a co-liable group that settled in Qalansawa and moved later to Taybe. This murder, which took place in 1972, provided a good opportunity for the head of tribe A to unite his members. At this time three co-liable groups, about three-fifths of the entire tribe, settled in the north of the Negev. One co-liable group settled in Lod in the early 1960s and the other two co-liable groups settled, as mentioned above, in Qalansawa.

This is a unique case where the majority of a tribe (the Kafar Qara example was a majority of a co-liable group, but not of a tribe) moved out of the Negev and settled in three different places, though not very far from each other. After the murder of the member of tribe A the head of the tribe assembled all males of the co-liable groups, including those living in the Triangle villages, for consultation. All of them went back to the Negev and concentrated in an encampment close to the Tel al-Milkh, an area which later was chosen for the airfield. The Bedouin were obliged to return to the Negev because of the importance attached to the collective responsibility of the co-liable group and the cohesiveness of the tribe. Despite the inconvenience of returning, all members did so.

In cases of blood dispute it is up to the injured co-liable group to decide either to agree to an ḍāṭawa (cease-fire) or to agree to end the blood dispute by receiving ḍiyā (blood money) and having a sulha (peace ceremony), or to take revenge by killing a member of the co-liable group whose member murdered one of their kin. It was in the interest of the leader of tribe A to increase the tension and to persuade the members of the injured co-liable group not to agree to ḍāṭawa, and moreover, to take revenge. Had the members of tribe A agreed to ḍāṭawa, tension would have abated. Not only would the members of the other co-liable groups have returned to their habitual occupation in the north of the Negev, but also the members of the injured co-liable group would have left the Negev to return (to) ... the Triangle (Ginat 1983a, case history 1). The revenge took place in May 1973 by killing the brother of the head of tribe B. In the summer of 1973 the members of the injured group went back to Qalansawa and later they settled in Taybe. Three members of the group were accused and were sentenced to life imprisonment. The leader of tribe A keeps close contact with the different groups who dwell in the north and visits them often. He pays special attention to visiting the co-liable group in Taybe and reports to them about his efforts to release the three men from jail (so far unsuccessfully).
Those Bedouin who settled in Kafar Qasem also have mutual visits with their kin in the Negev, but they also have non-kin contacts with Negev Bedouin. South of Kafar Qasem there is a grazing area to which come Negev Bedouin with their flocks and herds. The Kafar Qasem Bedouin are often asked for various kinds of help, including requests to act as a go-between with the authorities. They are frequently asked about their sedentarization in the village with a view, one must presume, to following their example. Thus social factors (visits to family members), economic factors (claim for land) and political factors (cohesiveness of tribe), intensify the interaction between those who settled in the Triangle villages and the Bedouin who remain in the Negev.

From the point of view of the villagers the Bedouin settlement in the villages was functional (from social, economic and political points of view). First, some villagers sold the Bedouin land for which they did not have full ownership rights. The land sale could not have taken place with any other group except the Bedouin. Secondly, in some instances the residents married out girls to Bedouin because they could not arrange a union from among the local residents. Thirdly, some village families who had small herds and flocks were able to maintain them because Bedouin, unlike the villagers, are still prepared to act as shepherds. Fourthly, in some villages the residents rented out or sold buildings for which they no longer had any use. This last experience is similar to that encountered by Dahya, who studied the patterns of Pakistani immigrant settlements in Bradford and Birmingham, England. Dahya (1974, 89) gives us information where the settlement was viewed as beneficial to both parties.

there were a number of factors such as environment, cheap housing, and easy access to transport and communications, which taken in conjunction with the economic circumstances and motives of the immigrant population, made for their settlement in the inner ring. Further, there was no competition for the houses there, where no one, other than the immigrants, wanted to live.

In the Bedouin sedentarization in the Triangle, the environment was also an essential factor. Close to all the four villages there are more or less suitable grazing areas. The land they purchased and the houses they bought or rented were relatively cheap. The location of the villages is very close to their working places -- Jewish agricultural settlements, the industrial areas and markets. The sedentarization of the Bedouin in the Triangle villages served both communities -- the villagers and those who immigrated, and it was possible to settle in the village due to the patron-client system.

The question to be answered is why the heads of the hamulas in Yamma, as well as representatives of the various political factions, reject the idea of settling 13 Bedouin families on Government owned land outside the village but adjacent to it. This has united most of the village. I shall make a comparison between Yamma and the four other villages, concentrating mainly on a comparison between Yamma and Kafar Qara. In Kafar Qara the Bedouin bought the land from the land authorities and not from the villagers. Secondly, the Bedouin erected their homes on this land outside of the village, yet belong to the local council of the village.
The Yamma villagers argue that culturally there are many differences between the Bedouin and themselves, and it is for this reason that they reject them. The villagers don't want any social interaction with the Bedouin and especially wish to avoid contacts between the Bedouin and their daughters. The Yamma residents feel that the land that the authorities have given the Bedouin would be a potential area of development for themselves in the future. The political aspect of the Bedouin's rejection was expressed as an afterthought but it is also of concern. The heads of two different hamulas told me that they fear that the Bedouin might upset the balance of votes in the local elections. The emic arguments which the villagers bring forward must also, however, be compared to the etic point of view of the Bedouin's rejection. Silverman (1977, 10) in her study on patronage as myth, has this to say:

My basic point is that patronage ought to be studied both from an etic and an emic point of view and that our ultimate aim should be to investigate how the etics and the emics of patronage may be related. ... If one described the behavior of patrons and clients on the basis of what informants say, or alternatively, if one describes ideas about patronage on the basis of one's inferences from behavior, then one has relinquished the possibility of asking how ideas and behavior are related, whether they conform or diverge, and why.

The main reason for rejecting the Bedouin by the people of Yamma lies in the framework of the patronage system. In the Yamma case the Bedouin did not come as individuals. Instead they came with an outsider patron and more important, a strong patron representing the authorities. This situation is viewed as a threat to the political leaders of Yamma. The most important objector is Ali who, in the past, used to be mukhtar (head of the village). In 1969, when Yamma and three other small villages were attached to the Regional Council of the local Jewish settlements, Ali was nominated to represent the village together with three members of other hamulas.

Ali is on good terms with the head of the council as well as with members of the council. He also has very good relations with different government representatives, especially those of the departments that deal with the Arab sector. Many of the Triangle villagers come to ask him to act as a go-between in their dealings with the authorities and conversely, the authorities use Ali when they need to deal with the residents. In this capacity Ali serves as middleman or mediator, which is equivalent to broker. If the Bedouin are settled in Yamma, Ali will not become their patron, nor will he act as a broker between the Bedouin peasants and the offices of the regional council of the government representatives. In the Yamma case the government patron will deal directly with the offices concerned.

Ali foresees a threat to his status and influence. For Ali it is not only that the Bedouin (whom he considers of low status) who come to the village will not need his services, but that the Bedouin are clients of the outsider patron. Because of the outsider patron's direct dealing with the government offices, sooner or later the Bedouin will become brokers for the villagers. Thus not only will the Bedouin not be dependent on Ali, but they will weaken his status and role within his own village and in the entire region as well.
At the present time Ali has a controlling influence on three levels: the local (the village), the regional (the Regional Council), and even on a wider level (his contact with government offices). Weinberg (1977, 144) states that: "If power is a function of control over resources, then the central problem is to determine 'who controls what, where and how' within a national or regional political system." Thus for a person who has power, and foresees losing this power if the Bedouin are to sedentarize in Yamma, one would expect him to do everything he can to prevent their settlement.

Gellner (1977, 1) says that "power in a well centralised and law-abiding bureaucracy is not a form of patronage, while Waterbury (1977, 335-36), referring to the same issue, argues that:

The state and its administrative apparatus can be seen as a patron in the abstract ... Individual bureaucrats, moving from post to post, broker the services of the anonymous patron, the state, to their own advantage. The state controls first order resources and its civil servants manipulate access to them.

In the Bedouin sedentarization case it is not the state that acts as patron but the individual in charge of moving the Bedouin from the area which was picked by the government for the airfield. This person, David, has two functions. He not only has to make sure that the area is evacuated, but also has to see to it that the Bedouin are permanently settled. David's job will be finished within a year or two, and then the Bedouin who were settled in Yamma will lose their patron. Gellner (1977, 4), in analysing the system of patronage, emphasizes that it tends "to be long-term, or at least not restricted to a single isolated transaction."

David is a member of a kibbutz in the Negev. He has lived close to the Bedouin tribes for the past 30 years. He is well known personally by the Bedouin and much respected in local government offices. Many of the Bedouin visit his home and he returns their visits. Over the past twenty years many Bedouin have asked David to act as a go-between in their various dealings with the authorities. When David finishes his present job he will go back to his kibbutz, but the Bedouin will still know where to find him, and they know that he will always listen to them and look after their interests if possible. The Bedouin are quite well aware that David's present job is temporary, but they also know that being in charge of this project, David accumulates power and status. When he goes back to his kibbutz he will return with more power and status than he had previously, and the Bedouin will, no doubt, try to make use of this fact.

Those Bedouin who agree to leave the area of the airfield without causing any problems and are willing to settle in Yamma are David's clients and he is their patron. Davis is aware of the fact that his clients have proved their loyalty by leaving the airfield territory. (There are some Bedouin who refuse to leave and whose claims are difficult to meet.) Now the patron has to do something for his clients -- in short, to settle them and take care of their needs.

Ali is aware of the relations between David and the Bedouin. He views the situation in realistic terms and not just as state-Bedouin relations.
To Ali the relations cannot «be seen as a patron in the abstract.» One of the Regional Council representatives of Yamma is a member of his hamula but belongs to a rival political faction. This person and his entire faction support the settlement of the Bedouin in Yamma. This is yet another reason why Ali protests the Bedouin settlement in Yamma. While the villagers' emic arguments must not be underestimated, the focus of objection for Bedouin settlement in Yamma is the etic -- the patronage issue.

Postscript

Since the fieldwork for this paper was completed, additional events concerning the village have occurred. On a day in July, a meeting took place between David, David's assistant, two of the Bedouin clients, the head of the Regional Council, Rashid and Saiyd who are members of a large Yamma hamula, and of course Ali. The meeting took place early in the morning at Ali's home. Because several villagers came to Ali's guest room to hear the proceedings, the participants moved to Rashid's home. It was felt that it would be inappropriate to continue what was probably going to be a very heated discussion in front of the guests, yet it would not be polite to tell people who had come to a guest room to leave.

The purpose of the meeting was to reach an agreement to settle the Bedouin within the Regional Council boundaries. The Bedouin acted as if they were insulted at having been rejected by the Yamma residents. When coffee was served prior to the discussion taking place the Bedouin refused to drink, ostensibly because of their rejection. The hosts played it very cool. Even though this act was a real insult in Bedouin and Arab rural social norms, the hosts took no notice (they didn't really care) and did not press their Bedouin guests a second time. However, after David spoke earnestly to the Bedouin, they accepted the offer.

The meeting lasted for over three hours, the situation being very complicated. Officially, everything was ready from the authority side to begin preparing the site for building. On the other hand, Ali had succeeded in passing a Regional Council decision that the Council will refrain from giving any services to the Bedouin if the government insists on settling them in Yamma. Ali suggested a different site outside the boundaries of Yamma but still within the agricultural land of the village. He thought that the Bedouin would turn down the suggestion, but that he would appear as a man with good intentions. However, Ali also took into consideration the possibility that the Bedouin might accept the offer. The land to which Ali referred is owned by the government but it is also land which is adjacent to land belonging to a rival relative who supports the Bedouin settlement in the village. Once his rival finds out that the Bedouin are to be settled next to his property, he and his entire political faction will change their minds and will oppose the Bedouin settlement in the area. Ali admits that one reason for his rejecting the Bedouin is that they might change the balance of the votes in the elections to his detriment. In a long discussion in private with Ali, David said that he would use all his influence to see that the Bedouin would support Ali, providing he does not lead the objection movement to the Bedouin settlement in Yamma. At the end of the meeting all of the participants went to see the new site which Ali had suggested. On viewing the site, the Bedouin agreed to be settled there, but there are bound to be further developments before the final outcome.
A second event also took place in the village on the same day in July. Two cousins, sons of two brothers who dwell at the northern edge of the village close to the place where the authorities had originally planned to settle the Bedouin, were married that day. The two brothers, the fathers of the two grooms belong to Ali's hamula. The other brother was the leader of a faction which had recently separate from Ali's. However, when the Bedouin problem arose, the two factions united again. The two brothers in consultation with Ali and receiving his encouragement, decided upon a very modest ceremony. The older brother, Tareq, has many friends among the villages of the Triangle and many acquaintances among Jewish officials. It would have been normal for him to have held a large wedding reception.

A big wedding ceremony with many guests that are invited, contributes to one's status. Marx (1973) in analyzing Bedouin circumcision feasts, explains that a Bedouin decides upon the date of circumcising his sons, (frequently they will have the ceremony for several sons at the same time), according to his political needs. When many guests come to his tent he accumulates power. Those who come to the feast bring presents which are actually a loan without interest but result in closer ties between the host and the guests. Sahlin (1965, 139) states that «if friends make gifts, gifts make friends.»

Tareq's decision to have a modest ceremony, which took place only for two hours, symbolized his protest against the Bedouin settlement right in his backyard. The Jewish members on the Regional Council, as well as govern employees, all of whom were not invited to the wedding, received the message. However, many of the villagers of the surrounding area came to Tareq's home. The rumours of the acceptance by the Bedouin to be settled near Ali's rival territory influenced the mood of the ceremony. It could be heard in the women's happy singing when they surrounded the two grooms and later when each couple was going to be led to their own home for the virginity test. The Bedouin acceptance was reached around noon, three hours prior to the wedding ceremony.

After the ceremony I went to Ali's home. He expressed his satisfaction at the agreement with the Bedouin which he sees and calls a temporary agreement Ali said that even if Bedouin do settle on the new site it will not bother him that much. When I reminded him about the arguments he had so strongly presented against their settlement, he answered that because they are to be situated on the new site they will not be Yamma residents. But what was obviously more important to him was to «fix» his rival.

After talking more with Ali it became clear that his objection to the Bedouin settlement was the patronage issue. He emphasized that he still believed that his rival's objection over the new site of the Bedouin settlement would mean the failure of the sedentarization plan. But in case they do settle, the Bedouin will want to become residents of Yamma. It will be difficult for them to be excluded from the Regional Council, but yet not considered members of the village close to where they live. Natural it is going to be Ali who will be approached to help them. Another dimension to the story is that Ali's son is the principal of the local elementary school, which the Bedouin children will compulsorily have to attend. Ali will thus become the middleman -- the broker.
I agree with Paine (1971, 21) that we have to refer to the function of patron, broker and middleman as roles and not statuses. However, I think that there is an overlap between the order of middleman and broker in the communities under study. Paine claims that the:

distinction rests upon the issues of the way in which the purveyance between two parties is performed. Where it is made faithfully, without manipulation or alteration, we may well speak of a go-between. The concept of broker, on the other hand, essentially has to do with processing of information (whether or not with the intent of mediation), and I reserve the use of broker to one who, while purveying values that are not his own, is also purposively making changes of emphasis and/or content ... Clearly, the role of broker is nearer to that of patron than is the go-between role.

I claim that it would be difficult to make a rule for all cases and for all situations. Paine (1971, 21) himself concludes:

As roles, patron, broker, go-between, and also client are dependent upon the situational context for their recognition; it is for the same reason -- that they are roles -- that they may be embraced alternately and even in combination by the same person.

In the case under study there is a combination of go-between and broker in the same person. Ali feels that under the new circumstances he will become the go-between broker of the Bedouin with the hope that in a second stage he might succeed in taking over the role of patron from David -- the powerful and influential individual who represents the Government. Ali took into consideration that even though he has power, which lies in his control of resources valued and desired by his villagers (Freeman 1971, 35), he might lose his power if the Bedouin are settled in Yamma with the representative of the authorities serving as the Bedouin's patron. By sedentarizing the Bedouin on the new site, when he will be needed later to act as their broker, he will retain his contemporary patronage over his clients without disturbance -- an important factor for Ali. Paine (1971, 21) states that: «A broker does not necessarily wish to become a patron. On the other hand, this role may provide the appropriate platform from which to obtain that of patron, and it is commonly used for this purpose.» In Ali's case he will probably become a patron and broker simultaneously: a patron for his client villagers (which he is already) and a broker for the Bedouin. Later on he hopes to become the Bedouin's patron as well.

NOTES

1. The Triangle is actually a strip of territory of Arab villages that were under Jordanian control after the War of Independence, 1948. This area was given to Israel in exchange for other territory in the Rhodes cease-fire agreement, 1949, between Israel and Jordan. The strip of land itself
does not form a triangle, but the three major cities (Tul Karem, Jenin and Nablus) in the Samarian region of the West Bank form a triangle of which this strip of land was a part.

2. Marx's (1981) discussion on the role of the anthropologist as mediator refers to the negotiations concerning the Bedouin evacuation of the airfield area.

3. Marx (1967, 80) explains: «Instead they are usually classified by place of origin; although each co-liable peasant group too has its name, derived from the founding ancestor, Bedouin call them 'Qi‘ā Tah' (people from Khān Yūnis), 'Ghazawīah' (from Gaza)... Each peasant group is thus placed on its own, and has politically to be dealt with separately, and not as part of peasant society. Yet the Bedouin are implicitly made aware of a distinct dividing line between themselves and the peasants, by the fact that there is a virtual bar against intermarriage and that the peasants are classified by place of origin, whereas the Bedouin are always classified according to tribal descent.»


5. Hamūla is a patronymic group. For addition to the members of a descent group, that is the offspring of one ancestor, the hamūla includes individuals who have voluntarily joined the core descent group. Together, all these constitute the patronymic group called hamūla.

6. In the village itself there are more than 100 houses that were built without the necessary building permit. Some of the Bedouin have already been taken to court and were fined; others are still waiting to appear before the court. This phenomenon is well known in most Arab villages.

In Kafar Qara, many villagers hope that the area where the Bedouin have built their homes will be attached to the building zone of the village. This will change the category of many villagers' houses that were built without a permit.

7. In the Arab villages there is more interest in the local elections than in the national ones. The struggle is for seats in the council (in the local elections there is usually 100 percent voting turnout, compared to 65-70 percent in the national elections). In this case, however, because there was a split in the hamūla, Abu Rafiq wanted to show his power in voting support from within and outside the hamūla.

8. The third type that Boissevain presents is on the national-political level, or on the regional level.

9. According to Ottoman Law of 1858 which both the British Mandatory regime adopted and the State of Israel has not so far changed, if 50 percent or more of a certain area cannot be cultivated (due to rocky land, for example), then the entire area belongs to the state. This is the case in this village. After the 1967 war some West Bank Arab villagers wanted to prove that they had cultivated rocky land by planting old olive trees in the area, in this way supporting their claim to the land. However, Israeli aerial photographs show that these trees had not been there prior to 1968.
10. The two groups who settled in Kafar Qasem and Taybe, respectively, each belong to one co-liable group (see note 11). In Qalansawa the Bedouin belong to two co-liable groups, both groups belonging to the same tribe. Those who settled in Taybe belong to the same tribe as those who settled in Qalansawa. In Kafar Qasem the Bedouin are from several different co-liable groups and from four different tribes although the majority are from one tribe. Except for one nuclear family that remained in the Negev, the Jabali co-liable group became desedentarized in Kafar Qasem. The situation in Kafar Qara is identical to that of the Jabali group.

11. The term "co-liable" group was coined by Marx in Bedouin of the Negev (1967, 64). It refers to the khams, the group formed by all descendants of one ancestor to a fifth generation.

12. See Ginat (1983a and 1983b), for information on blood revenge and the role of the mediator in arranging `atwa.


14. Sometimes there is a need for the authorities to deal with the villagers concerning some matter. For example, sometimes the government wishes to exchange government owned land for plots owned by an Arab resident. Another example is where the authorities need to lay water pipes or electricity pylons across privately owned land. In such cases negotiations through a go-between are usually more satisfactory for both parties than when the due process of law is used to obtain the necessary privileges.

15. Waterbury (1977, 333) asks, "whether or not patronage is a 'good' thing. Is it 'functional'? Answers to these questions can only be made for the positive, 'integrative' functions of patronage which mitigate class cleavages and social conflict and link the powerless to the larger system."

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12. See Ginat (1983a and 1983b), for information on blood revenge and the role of the mediator in arranging «atwa».

13. See Ginat (1982, 6-7, 39-40) for information regarding the joining of Yamma to the Regional Council.

14. Sometimes there is a need for the authorities to deal with the villagers concerning some matter. For example, sometimes the government wishes to exchange government owned land for plots owned by an Arab resident. Another example is where the authorities need to lay water pipes or electricity pylons across privately owned land. In such cases negotiations through a go-between are usually more satisfactory for both parties than when the due process of law is used to obtain the necessary privileges.

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Joseph Ginat
Department of Eretz-Israel Studies
Haifa University
Mount Carmel, Haifa, Israel